This paper studies the variation in village head selection rules across Indonesia using panel data over 1997-2007. The selection of village heads is often thought of as being determined by national level legislation, with elections in villages located in kabupaten and directly appointed village heads for villages within kota. However, existing legislation allows a degree of autonomy by villages to determine their own village's institutional structure. I find that a larger majority of an ethnic group within Indonesian villages is associated with having elected village heads. Further, evidence is found that the changing composition of governments at the district level, as well as changes in village level ethnic majority size is associated with village level institutional change.
Introduction
'Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies.' (North 1990, p. 6 ).
The structure of sub-national governments is shaped by two competing forces.
Rules can be imposed from 'above' by governments at higher levels and these rules can quickly change at the stroke of a pen. These rules will constrain both the type of institutions sub-national governments have as well as the ability of sub-national governments to change form. On the other hand, potential new sub-national institutional forms will also be motivated by 'customs, traditions and codes of conduct', which move much more slowly. I refer to these constraints as constraints from 'below'. In this paper, I investigate the importance of these two sides for both realised institutional form and institutional change. I take Indonesian villages over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] as the units of analysis and the rules for which they select their village head as the institutional form. National laws form the constraints from above and village-level ethnic composition is used to capture constraints from below.
Indonesian village types are demarcated by the type of district in which they are a part (see Figure 1 ). There are two types of district in Indonesia: kabupaten and kota. 1 Kabupaten are predominately (although not always 2 ) rural, and kota are predominately urban. Villages that are within kabupaten are called desa, and are presumed to have elections. Villages within kota are called kelurahan and presumed to have village heads that are appointed at the kota or kecamatan (sub-district) level. Kelaruhan and desa have the same rank in the Indonesian government system. I refer to these collectively as villages. 1 In English, kabupaten is occasionally translated as a regency, and kota as a municipality. Throughout this paper I will use the Indonesian names, and 'districts' when talking about both kabupaten and kota.
2 Indeed, the urban/rural classification is based upon census data as administered by Statistics Indonesia (hereafter BPS, Badan Pusut Statstik), which has led to a distinction between institutions and geography since 1961 (Evans 1984) .
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Villages are the lowest level of government in Indonesia, but they have increasing importance in the delivery of public goods and services. Currently the village government can generate local legislation, and plays the major role in conflict resolution within the country (McLaughlin and Perdana 2010) . There are also a number of higher level government programmes that deliver resources directly to villages or to village designed projects through a local government (district or kecamatan) level. These include the Kecamatan Development Program (Olken 2010 ) and the national program of community self-empowerment (PNPM-Mandiri 2012) . Village are now also connected to global initiatives like the REDD+ 3 initiative (FORDA 2012) . With exceptions (Antlöv 2003) , it is commonly presumed that the demarcation of elections in desa and appointments in kelurahan still exists (Bandiera and Levy 2011) . I find evidence that challenges this presumption. Table 1 Tables 1 and 2 . This work has implications wider than increasing our understanding of Indonesia's ongoing decentralisation. The research feeds into a large literature on the political economy of ethnicity (see for example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Michalopoulos (2012) ). Much work has highlighted the costs of ethnic composition, which arise because of divergent preferences, beliefs and norms across ethnic groups. Ethnic diversity, as measured by ethno-linguistic fragmentation, has been shown to increase the costs of maintaining agreements in rural villages (Miguel and Gugerty 2005) in Kenya and lower trust (Okten and Okonkwo-Osili 2004) in Indonesia. Bandiera and Levy (2011) find that with higher ethnic diversity, the public goods outcomes match those of the elites. This is explained by coalition formation between elites and minorities against the poor majority.
I argue that ethnic composition can go one further, and actually explain institutional form: the rules of the rules of the game, rather than the rules of the game.
If higher coordination costs with divergent preferences are a more general phenomenon, we might expect that institutions evolve to minimise them (North 1990 ). Indeed, institutional design of collective action can alleviate the costs of ethnic diversity (Khwaja 2009 , Easterly 2001 . Trebbi et al. (2008) investigate the role of US Voting Rights Act of 1965, which enfranchised minorities in the southern US, lead to majorities (legally) changing voting rules to protect their interests. Aghion et al. (2004) find that ethnic fragmentation is associated with more 'insular' constitutional form. That is, an ethnically (and linguistically) fragmented country is more likely to have autocratic leaders and if democratic, a fragmented country is more likely to have a presidential rather than a parliamentary system. Similar results are found in this research.
Secondly, this analysis provides valuable empirical research on constitutional change. Constitutions are commonly presumed to move slowly (North 1990 ), but there is evidence that constitutions are rewritten enough for empirical investigation (Hayo and Voigt 2010 , Aghion et al. 2004 , Trebbi et al. 2008 . Overall, there is a paucity of empirical evidence on constitutional change (Voigt 2011 ).
This analysis into constitutional outcomes and constitutional change complements this nascent branch of investigation with empirical investigation at the sub-national level.
It may possibly be argued that 'constitutions' only exist at the national level.
I argue that this is mistaken, and this view unnecessarily limits the evidence that can be accumulated. Constitutions are the rules that frame the rules of the game, with policies and laws being the rules of the game. Clearly, the rules over the selection of a village head is of a qualitatively similar role than the selection of a national leader, even if the consequences does not affect as many people.
Village heads have responsibilities to deliver public goods and services, and the rules for selection heads will shape the types and actions of village heads.
It is true that national governments have de jure sovereignty, which lower level governments do not have. However, there are likely to be de facto constraints on the feasible national constitutional choice set, arising from the international community. Finally, recent lab work has experimentally investigated the role of constitutions (Sutter et al. 2010) , which has been used as evidence for constitutional change (Voigt 2011) . Given this, it seems entirely reasonable to use local governments as a unit of analysis with which to empirically investigate constitutional forms and change. When we consider the paucity of evidence on constitutional change we currently have, then interpretation appears necessary.
The outline of the paper is follows. In the next section I will provide an overview of village level constitutions as legislated throughout the many types of central governments that controlled Indonesia over the twentieth century. I then discuss the theoretical framework, followed by the data, model and results.
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Village governance in Indonesia
Modern Indonesia has had a history of the national government imposing institutional structures on villages (Kato 1989 , Antlöv 2000 . Throughout the last century, villages and wards have been subject to top down regulation applied at the national level from a variety of masters. These constraints from above are be 'made uniform', penyeragaman bentuk, (Antlöv 2000) . Villages could switch from desa to kelurahan, subject to the approval of the Central Government.
Desa were elected, but subject to screening by the head of the sub-district and local institutions became accountable to the hierarchy and much like at the national level, elections in many villages were only in name (Antlöv 2000, Ranis and Stewart 1994 Villages can still change from a desa to a kelurahan where social or economic needs dictate 9 , but as in previous legislation there is no provision for the alternative. To switch, desa require consent from two thirds of the local population, and agreement with the district head. Villages may be 'required' to change to a kelurahan because they are now in a kota, but it has been suggested that villages are hesitant to change (Antlöv 2003) . Overall, these top down pressures appear to constrain the set of feasible institutional forms.
However, there are conflicting statements within all the acts since the fall of
Suharto. There is emphasis on the authority to regulate and manage based on local customs of desa (or village by any other name). 10 There is a tension between traditional and slow moving economic forces that create local incentives for institutional change and top down restrictions. This is a similar tension to that proposed by Ranis and Stewart (1994) , who note that the diversity of Indonesia requires decentralisation of governance, and the existence of Indonesia requires a strong central state. Some villages may wish to change their institutions due to constraints from below, but may find it legally difficult given constraints from above; other villages may wish to keep their village institutions, but pressure from above may force a change. This tension leads to an imperfect mapping from rural location to kabupaten to desa to village level institutional form. 
A theoretical underpinning
A useful way of framing constitutions is that of a delegation game (Persson and Tabellini 2003) . In our case, the village head is delegated responsibilities from one of two delegators. Elections allocate power of delegation over the selection of village heads to villagers, whereas a system of unelected village heads allocates delegation power to a higher government level. Once the game has been played, the next stage is the repeated day-to-day functioning of the village, including legislation and public goods and services allocation. The payoffs to the delegation game depend on this next stage of repeated interactions. It has been shown that preferences over public goods and services allocation diverge over ethnic lines (Alesina et al. 1999) Villagers are recipients of public goods and services and have a different relationship with their village head than higher level governments. Elections allow villagers to retain residual control rights over their village head and would result 9 in lower agency costs. This could improve public goods and service outcomes within the village. However, it is plausible that appointed village heads have better relationships with higher levels of government. As public goods and services are decided by fiat, having a village head better connected with higher levels of government could be advantageous. However, the more villages that employ this strategy, the more quickly the common pool of connected village heads becomes dry. Villages could also conceivably desire appointed village heads, which may be the case where the costs of coordinating divergent preferences are higher, and appointed village heads could be a lower cost institution (Aghion et al. 2004 ). For instance, some villages may have strong communal ties and have common preferences, whereas others may be more fragmented.
Although we have reason to consider both directions, I expect a positive relationship between majority size and elections. A larger majority is more able to exert control over the selection of the village head under voting. Additionally, agency costs are larger under an appointed head, where there is no de jure capacity for selecting preferred candidates. These costs are expected to be higher than the opportunity cost, of which major contributor in this framework is having greater public goods and service from a village head connected to higher levels of government.
A negative relationship between the change in majority size and a change in village head selection is expected, whereby a dwindling majority is attempting to pre-empt change (Trebbi et al. 2008) or having change imposed upon them.
Here, elections would soon favour the emerging majority and the old majority could delay this from occurring with a switch to non-elected village heads. Preexisting levels of majority size are not expected to have an effect. Although a larger majority can overcome the coordination problem to exert change, it is likely that villages with larger majorities would also have already established their preferred institutions, or become satisfied with current institutions. 
Data
The data used in this analysis comes from the second and forth waves of the Majority size is a proxy for the the costs involved in collective decision making.
There are limitations with this proxy, for instance, it is not possible to identify whether it is ethnic majorities, ethnic fragmentation or ethnic polarisation that best explains these results, since all three variables are highly correlated. I proceed by focusing on majorities, since these provide the most 'intuitive' results, however I stress that this is an untested assumption. For completeness, I replicate regressions [5] and [7] of Table 4 in Table A7 where we see that the results are much the same, except we have a different interpretation.
Additionally, preferences diverge along other dimensions or preferences may diverge differently within ethnic groups. Other variables correlated with preferences, for instance income, could not be used because of missing data at the community level. Additionally, our measure is noisy in that it is only estimated by one individual. This could be a simple problem of merely guessing incorrectly, or more fundamental in that ethnic groupings as estimated by one individual may diverge from how individuals and groups perceive themselves.
This problem of noisy-ness will only bias our results towards zero.
The institutional variable used in this paper is the mechanism for selecting the village head. In particular, a village leader answers the following: What type of decision making process is used by local residents to select the head of the village? There is little reason to suspect that the response to this question would be subject to any bias and I create a dummy variable equal to one if villages had elections.
Outside of elections, other potential responses include village heads appointed by higher levels of government, consensus and elite decisions. The latter two are left out because in the 2007 survey, these were subsumed into the category 'other'. Almost half of the village-year observations had elections, as presented in Table 3 .
Additional control variables reflect factors that affect the costs and benefits of a village in whether or not to elect their village head. Of these, migration is the most likely to be correlated with ethnic majorities. Migration is a dummy variable equal to one if the village had a 'migration induced population change' over the period 1992-1997, although we do not observe whether this is an increase or decrease. Urban areas, being typically larger and sources of migration are also likely to have higher degrees of ethnic fragmentation. More highly populated villages are also more likely to be more heterogenous. Since urban areas are predominately kota, these variables are also likely to be correlated with the village head selection mechanism.
An additional variable is created to investigate the effect of pemekaran. Using data from a government list on autonomous regional government expansion, 11 district names were mapped to the list to determine whether the village was inside a 'parent' district, where a new district was formed out of the village's district. A 'child' district is a district that split off from an old district. Both 12 One village in the IFLS sample managed to firstly be part of a child district then part of a parent district. It is not included in the regression because -coincidentally -we are missing data on village head selection. district, and most of these were on the outer islands of Sumatera, Kalimantan, and the Sulawesi archipelago.
Model
Following Wooldridge (2002) , to investigate whether or not local majorities are correlated with elections I estimate the following model:
where the unit of observation is a village v, jurisdiction j (with j = d, p,where d is district and p is province) at time t. X is a vector of covariates and E ∈ {0, 1} is a discrete measure of the whether or not the village head was elected. Village, district and time fixed effects are included. The district and provincial fixed effects, α d , α p , for the pooled estimation are at the 1993 boundary, because of the changing boundaries over the following fourteen years. The pooled estimation is conducted with a linear probability model, since the probit fixed effects model removes observations that do not change over time. (Table A7 ). These variables would be biased towards zero with these missing villages, yet, they remain significant. Thus, non random selection bias does not appear to invalidate the results. This points to a broader problem, in that unfortunately I cannot distinguish whether the paper's overall results are driven by majorities, fragmentation or polarisation since the estimates of these variables are practically collinear (Table A6 ) and we cannot decide between them. I focus on majority size, however, the precise nature of coordination costs is not relevant for my argument, which is about the variation in coordination costs across villages.
Consistent estimation requires that
To estimate whether or not a village changed its village head selection mechanism, I employ the following cross sectional model:
13 I thank Robert Sparrow for this suggestion.
Where ∆S ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether or not the village head a different mech- In all regressions, the covariates of interest X include the size of the majority ethnic group in the village, whether the village had migration induced population change over 1993-1997, whether the village is in a kabupaten, whether the village is urban, and whether the village's district had a new district form out of it (parent), or became a new district (child), and pemekaran is indicates either that the village is in either a parent or a child district. Majority size ranges between 0 and 100, and all the other covariates are dummy variables. Summary statistics are found in Table 3 . 
Results
The results in Table 4 show that the size of the ethnic majority is positively associated with elected village heads, a result consistent with expectations. Majority size is effectively identical across various single equation specifications of jurisdictional fixed effects. IV estimates of the effect of majority size are still positive and significant, however they are larger and significantly different from than the single equation estimates. There is possibly some third variable having opposite effects on both majority size and elections. A plausible explanation is that migration is associated with elections, and migration also reduces the majority size. Estimates from the full IV model (regression [7] ) indicate that a one standard deviation increase in majority size is associated with a 66 percent increase in the probability of having an elected village head.
A district that changes status from with kabupaten -which are required by one particular article of legislation to have elections, is to increase the probability of having elections by 43.9 percent, however this effect is not significantly dif- Table 4 : Linear probability model (LPM) to predict probability of a village head being directly elected by villagers. The units of analysis are village-years. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a village head was directly elected. All regressions contain village and 1993 district boundary fixed effects. Regressions [6] and [7] using enumerator ID as an instrument for majority size.
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[2]
[3]
[4]
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[6] That the coefficient on local majorities is still highly significant and has an effect of such a magnitude after including controlling for key variables regarding higher levels of government provides confidence in the general result that despite the constraints imposed from above, local political economy considerations from below matter. Table 5 presents the results on whether a village changed its institutions for selecting the village head over the ten year period. A change in selectionwhether from not have elections to having elections or vice versa -is regressed on changes in variables and on 1997 levels, as well as changes associated with pemekaran at the district level. The IV regression is without changes in majority size because the instrument, enumerator ID is only correlated in levels.
Three main determinants of a village changing from elections to non elections are found. Firstly, a reduction in the size of the majority over 1997-2007 is associated with an increased propensity to no longer have elections. Although one must be careful of making too strong a claim, since we do not have precise dates on institutional and demographic changes, this coefficient is consistent with recent finding that dwindling majorities will work within existing rules to prevent the emerging majority from obtaining control (Trebbi et al. 2008 ).
Conversely, a village with a migration-induced population change between 1992
and 1997 is less likely to switch from elections. In fact, the migration variable predicts failure perfectly, so no villages with migration induced population Table 5 : Linear probability models for whether the village changed their selection mechanism over 1997-2007. The units of analysis are villages. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a village head changed from being elected or not.
[6] This tempers evidence against the above interpretation of dwindling majorities protecting themselves, however, there are two caveats to this conclusion.
Firstly, the timing of the variables differs, as the migration variable occurs before the change in majority size. It is possible that new migrants have been able to establish themselves in the community by the time that a dwindling majority has decided to change institutions. Secondly, we cannot observe whether the migration-induced population change resulted in a larger or smaller population.
Finally, being in a district that becomes a kabupaten is associated with a decreased propensity to change from elections -or alternatively -being a village in a district that becomes a kota is associated with no longer having elections. This is consistent with the standard legislative story of village level institutions. The results provide evidence that variation in village level ethnic majority size does help explain whether or not a village has an elected head. Ethnic majority size is associated with an increased propensity of a village to hold elections to select their village head. There is also some evidence that changes in a village's ethnic majority size is also a determinant of changing from elections to non elections. Finally, larger majorities at the onset of reformasi were more likely to change from non-elections to elections by 2007. Overall, we can conclude that village institutions are endogenous to the composition of a village's population.
We also see that factors exogenous to the village are associated with institutional change. Location within a district that changes from a kabupaten to a kota -or vice versa, as well as the role of districts splitting and earlier migration induced population change are significant determinants. The results are consistent with the idea of a 'window' of change, where an exogenous shock provides opportunity for those with the capacity to change institutions to do so. There is an overlap here with the 'critical junctures' theory of income and democracy 15 (?) . The shock provided by the Asian Financial Crisis, which allowed the toppling of Suharto led to rapid decentralisation in the country. Much of the analysis has been limited to the district level, since this is where much of the national government's functions were reallocated. However, I find evidence that this has had ramifications even at the village level, with shocks exogenous to the village having a robust correlation with village level institutions.
There is no doubt in the author's mind that other factors, for instance the village level income distribution, are also important. A fuller collection of variables that could separate local from higher level determinants of institutional form and change would be valuable. This is particularly so given the currently small stock of empirical evidence on constitutional change. Majorities, fragmentation or polarisation?
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